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In re Equipment Services: Why the Court was Forced to
Reach a Result Unintended by Congress
Timothy R. Halbach1
I. INTRODUCTION
A financially troubled individual comes to your office seeking ad-
vice. You review his situation, explain his options, and recommend
that he file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.2 You inform him you will
represent him for an hourly fee and that you will require $500 as a
retainer. He agrees and pays you. You prepare and file his petition.
It is clear that you should be able to keep this $500 as long as you have
performed $500 worth of services by the time the bankruptcy petition
has been filed.
After the petition has been filed and a trustee has been appointed,
the § 341 meeting is held, where it is often beneficial for the debtor to
have an attorney present to ensure that his personal interests are pro-
tected.3 You attend and for your time and effort at the meeting, de-
termine that you are owed an additional $500. At this point, all of the
debtor's property, including his cash, is property of the bankruptcy
estate. You ask the trustee and the court to pay you the $500 you are
owed, but the court denies your request because § 330 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code ("Code"), which is the statute that authorizes compensa-
tion, does not allow a debtor's attorney to receive fees from the
bankruptcy estate after the petition is filed.4
Let's look at another scenario. You help a small business prepare
and file a petition for bankruptcy in Chapter 11, which allows for a
reorganization of the business and sets up a payment plan.5 Initially,
the business remains with the debtor, deeming the debtor a debtor-in-
1. J.D. from DePaul University College of Law expected May 2004; University of Wisconsin -
La Crosse, B.S. 2001.
2. Individuals, partnerships and corporations can file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In this pro-
ceeding most of a debtor's property is sold to pay off creditors as much as possible. Certain
property is exempted to enable the debtor a "fresh start."
3. A § 341 meeting is between creditors and equity security holders where the debtor is noti-
fied of his rights under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2002).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2002).
5. Partnerships, corporations or individuals can file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
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possession.6 You continue to act as an attorney for the business in
helping it with its bankruptcy. At this point, you have a total bill of
$5,000. However, the business is no longer able to continue to make
payments as part of the reorganization plan and is forced to transfer
its petition into a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding where a trustee is
automatically appointed. Again, the § 341 meeting is held where the
debtor often benefits from having his personal attorney present. You
attend and determine that for your services you are owed an addi-
tional $1,000. You make a motion with the court and the trustee for
your $1,000 as a reasonable attorney's fee, and you are denied because
once again the court holds that § 330 does not allow an attorney to
receive compensation.
The latter scenario is similar to the situation that occurred to the
debtor's attorney, John M. Lamie, in In re Equipment Services, Inc.
("Equipment Services").7 After analyzing § 330, the court in Equip-
ment Services found that it was unclear as to whether Congress in-
tended to allow the debtor's attorney to receive his fees from the
bankruptcy estate after the appointment of a trustee. However, the
court felt since the statute was not ambiguous, it was bound to follow
the language of the statute and deny Lamie his attorney's fees.8
This note asserts that the court in Equipment Services reached the
only possible outcome. However, a solution needs to be found in the
determination of whether a debtor's attorney can receive compensa-
tion under § 330 of the Code.
Prior to when the Code was amended in 1994, a debtor's attorney
was specifically included in the language of § 330 as eligible for com-
pensation; however, after the amendments, a debtor's attorney is no
longer included. 9 Nothing in the legislative history of § 330 appears to
support this result. 10 While this note contends that Congress should
resolve this problem, on March 10, 2003, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.1 '
First, an overview of the bankruptcy laws on attorney fees will be
given. 12 Second, the note will review five other court of appeals deci-
sions that have confronted this problem.' 3 Third, it will analyze the
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2002). When a debtor serves as a debtor-in-possession, he essentially
has the same duties as a trustee.
7. In re Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1480 (2003).
8. See infra Part 111.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 123 S.Ct. 1480 (2003).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part tl.B.
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Fourth Circuit's opinion in Equipment Services.14 Fourth, the note
will analyze the statute and the case law. 15 Fifth, it will suggest that
Congress is best able to solve this problem, but since the Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari, it will suggest an outcome for
the Court to follow. 16 Finally, the note will be summarized in the
conclusion.1 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Attorney Fees in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
The first general bankruptcy statute was the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 ("Act"), which vested jurisdiction in the United States district
courts. 18 Section 62 of the Act allowed for payment of fees for the
debtor's attorney. 19 Section 64 of the Act made fees for a debtor's
attorney a fourth priority and allowed for a reasonable attorney's
fee.20 The amount of the fee was to be determined by the character
and condition of the case and the time and care required of the attor-
ney.2' The Act, which failed to specify what compensation attorneys
could receive, gave great deference to the courts to determine reason-
able compensation. 22 The statutory language of awarding attorney's
fees had remained virtually unchanged and was still a fourth priority
as of 1978.23
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
19. "(a) The actual and necessary expenses incurred by officers in the administration of es-
tates shall, except where other provisions are made for their payment, be reported in detail,
under oath, and examined and approved or disapproved, by the court. If approved, they shall be
paid or allowed out of the estates in which they were incurred." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, § 62, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978).
20. "(b) The debts to have priority ... and to be paid in full out of bankruptcy estates... (3)
.. one reasonable attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespective of
the number of attorneys employed, . . . as the court may allow." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, § 64, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978).
21. WILLIAM OPPENHEIMER, BRANDENBURG ON BANKRUPTCY § 1318, at 962 (4th ed. 1917).
22. Id.; see also Guterman v. C.D. Parker & Co., Inc, 86 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1936). The amount
of attorney fees allowed in bankruptcy cases rests with the sound discretion of the court.
23. "In advance of distribution to creditors, there shall first be paid in full, out of the moneys
paid in by or for the debtor, and the order of payment shall be - (4) such reasonable fee to the
attorney for the debtor as the court may allow for the professional services actually rendered by
such attorney to the debtor in and in connection with the proceedings under this chapter."
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 § 659, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, creating
what is commonly known as the Bankruptcy Code, took effect and
replaced the Act.24 The Code has subsequently been revised by sub-
stantial amendments in 1984,25 1986,26 and 1994.27 With the recent
rise in the number of bankruptcies, a strong effort has been made by
many members of Congress to revise the Code again, with their most
recent effort failing.28
By 1986, the Code had set out the compensation that an attorney
could receive and had given the court less of a duty to decide the
definition of reasonableness. 29 Under the Bankruptcy Act, the attor-
ney had to seek approval from the court to receive his or her fees. 30
Now under the Code, the attorney files with the court a statement of
what is to be paid to the attorney. The court then does not need to
approve the fees, but it has the power to not allow the fees if it feels
that they are not reasonable. 3' The statutory authority for compensat-
ing and reimbursing the services of the officers of the estate, including
the debtor's attorney is found in § 330. The 1986 version of § 330
stated in relevant part:
(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States
trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of
this title, the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title,
or to the debtor's attorney-
(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered
by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the
case may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such
trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, based
on the nature, the extent, and the value of such
services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable
services other than in a case under this title.32
24. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
25. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
346 (1984).
26. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
27. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147 (1994).
28. Why Bankruptcy Reform Failed This Year, 12 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS 8, Dec. 24, 2002.
The latest reason for not reforming the Bankruptcy Code is that some members of Congress feel
that fines and penalties shall not be discharged on anti-abortion protestors.
29. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 76 F.3d 66, 71 (2nd Cir. 1996) (stating that, "[in enacting
Section 330, Congress departed from [the previous] doctrine of strict review.").
30. See supra text accompanying note 19.
31. "(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court
may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment." 11 U.S.C. § 329
(2002).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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As a result of the enactment of the Code, attorney's fees are given a
first priority under § 507(a)(1). 33 Note that initially under the Act,
attorney's fees were given a fourth priority. 34 Thus, this creates a
greater incentive for bankruptcy attorneys to represent debtors be-
cause the attorney knows that he or she will get paid from the bank-
ruptcy estate before anyone else.
In 1994, Congress made sweeping changes to many sections of the
Code.35 One of those affected was § 330. The primary purpose for
overhauling this section was to give clearer guidance as to how a court
should determine compensation by giving some parameters for the
definition of reasonableness because some members of Congress felt
that attorneys were charging excessive amounts in bankruptcy cases
and abusing their power.36 The factors to be looked at are now listed
in § 330.37
Senate Bill 540, amending § 330, as originally introduced in the Sen-
ate contained the following language:
(a)(1) After notice to the parties interest and the United States trus-
tee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the
court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103, or the debtor's attorney, after
considering comments and objections submitted by the United
States Trustee in conformance with guidelines adopted by the Exec-
utive Office for United States Trustees pursuant to section
586(a)(3)(A) of title 28-
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services ren-
dered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. 38
Later, on April 21, 1994 Senator Howard Metzenbaum proposed
amendment 1645 to Senate Bill 540.39 The amendment omitted the
33. Section 507(a)(1) states: "[tlhe following expenses and claims have priority in the follow-
ing order: First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title .... " 11
U.S.C. § 507 (2003). Section 503(b)(2) states: "[aifter notice and a hearing there shall be al-
lowed administrative expenses . . . including - compensation and reimbursement awarded
under section 330(a) of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2003).
34. See supra text accompanying note 20.
35. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147 (1994).
36. Bankruptcy Reform Act § 224(b). See also WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANK.
RUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 26:5 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that, "[t]he purpose of these amend-
ments was to foster greater uniformity in the application, processing and approval of fees.").
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(A) (2002). The court now looks at such factors as the amount of
time spent on services, the customary rates charged for such services, whether the services were
necessary and beneficial to the estate, and whether the services were performed in a reasonable
amount of time.
38. S. REP. No. 103-168, at 247 (1994) (emphasis added).
39. See 140 CONG. REC. S4741-01 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Metzenbaum).
20031
620 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
phrase "or the debtor's attorney" from § 330(a) and the twenty-nine
words that followed the phrase. These remaining twenty-nine words
were combined with another section dealing with objections to attor-
ney's fees and placed into a new § 330(a)(2).40 Mysteriously, the
phrase "or the debtor's attorney" was not placed in another section of
§ 330. In proposing this amendment, Senator Metzenbaum acknowl-
edged that attorneys were charging too much. 41 Later that day, the
Senate passed Senate Bill 540, as modified by Senator's Metzen-
baum's Amendment. The bill was then referred to the House of
Representatives. 42
On August 17, 1994, the House Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law met and the National Association of Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys ("NACBA") commented on the proposed text
of § 330, now contained in House Bill 5116:
This provision appears to have some minor drafting errors, includ-
ing the apparently inadvertent removal of debtors' attorneys from the
list of professionals whose compensation awards are covered by sec-
tion 330(a). NACBA does not oppose this provision, since it con-
tains language ensuring that chapter 12 and 13 individual debtors'
attorneys may be awarded compensation for their work in protect-
ing the debtor's interests in a bankruptcy case. 43
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 5116, which included
the text of § 330 as passed by the Senate. 44 The Senate later passed
House Bill 5116, and the Metzenbaum Amendment became part of
the final language of the statute.45
As the 1994 Amendment finally emerged from Congress following
several floor amendments, the final relevant portion § 330 as it looks
today states:
(a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States
Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the
court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103-
40. "The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the United States Trustee, the
United States Trustee for the District or Region, the trustee for the estate, or any other party in
interest, award compensation that is less than the amount of compensation that is requested." 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(2) (2002).
41. See 140 CONo. Rec. S14597-02 (daily ed. Oct 7, 1994) (statement of Rep. Metzenbaum).
42. See 140 CONG. Ruc. S4666-02 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994).
43. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing on H.R. 5116 Before the Subcomm. On Econ. And Commer-
cial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 550-51 (1994) (emphasis added).
44. See 140 CONG. REc. H10917-03 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994).
45. See 140 CONG. Ruc. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994).
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(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services ren-
dered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person.46
Thus, the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney" was omitted. Also,
note that in the 1994 Amendment the conjunction "or" is missing after
examiner, thus making the sentence seemingly grammatically un-
sound.47 Also under (A), notice that it allows for reasonable compen-
sation for the same three individuals as mentioned in part (a)(1) but
"attorney" is included in (A), which quite possibly could have been
originally put in to correspond with the "debtor's attorney" in (a)(1).
Thus, no principled reason appears in any of the legislative history
for the removal of the critical phrase "or to the debtor's attorney"
from the 1986 version of § 330. In 1997, two bills were introduced that
included provisions that would have put that phrase back into
§ 330(a). 48 It is unclear as to why neither of these measures passed;
thus, it is possible that Congress purposely left the phrase out and has
no intention of putting it back into the statute.
Other discrepancies in the Code exist. Specifically, § 329 allows the
attorney of a debtor to file with the court a statement for compensa-
tion for his or her services.49 This section does not expressly authorize
any such compensation, but it suggests that a debtor's attorney should
receive reasonable fees. Section 330 is the section of the Code that
expressly authorizes compensation.
Also, Section 331, which is of course, directly after § 330, starts off
by saying, "A trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any profes-
sional person .... -50 Note that these are the exact same four persons
included in § 330(a) before the 1994 amendments. Section
330(a)(1)(A) includes almost exactly these same four persons as
well.51 Logically, it would make sense that since these two sections
are next to each other in the Code that they would correspond to each
other. Prior to the 1994 amendments they did, but now no explana-
tion exists for why they no longer do.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2002).
47. To make (a)(1) grammatically sound, a conjunction, preferably an "or," should be placed
after "examiner." Thus, the phrase would read "a trustee, an examiner or a professional person
48. See H.R. 120, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997); H.R. 764, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
49. "(a) Any attorney representing a debtor ... shall file with the court a statement of the
compensation paid or agreed to be paid ... for services rendered or to be rendered in contem-
plation of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and the source of such compensa-
tion." 11 U.S.C. § 329 (2002).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (2002) (emphasis added).
51. Section 330(a)(1)(A) includes: "trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person." 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(t)(A) (2002).
2003]
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In addition, the 1994 Amendments added a separate provision,
which provided for the allowance of reasonable compensation for at-
torneys for Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 bankruptcies.52 A Chapter 12
bankruptcy is reserved for family farmers. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy
sets up a repayment plans for individuals with small debts.53 There-
fore, attorneys for Chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcies are unaffected by
the discrepancy in the language in § 330(a). 54 It is important to note
that in a Chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy, a trustee's role is more limited
than that of a trustee in Chapter 7 or 11. The debtor in a Chapter 12
or 13 bankruptcy retains control of the estate.5 5 Of course, in a Chap-
ter 7 or a Chapter 11 bankruptcy with a trustee, the trustee gains con-
trol of the estate. 56
It is also important to note that other sections of the Code besides
§ 330 allow for compensation to attorneys. These sections enable at-
torneys to collect their fees from any wrongdoers involved in the
bankruptcy. Whenever a group of bidders at a sale of property from
the estate engage in collusive bidding, the trustee may then be entitled
to a reasonable attorney's fee from such parties for recovering such
property.57 Whenever a creditor requests a dischargeability determi-
nation of a consumer debt and such debt is discharged, the debtor
shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the creditor for
the proceeding, however this is only if the court finds that the position
of the creditor was not substantially justified.58 After notice and a
hearing, an entity shall be entitled to payment of administrative ex-
penses, including reasonable compensation for and reimbursement of
actual and necessary expenses incurred by an entity's attorney.59
Whenever an involuntary bankruptcy case is commenced under Chap-
52. "In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case... the court may allow reasonable compensation to the
debtor's attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy
case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and the
other factors set forth in this section." 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).
53. See 11 U.S.C. 109(e) (2002). To qualify for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor must have
unsecured debts of less than $250,000 and secured debts of less than $750,000.
54. In re Ramey, 266 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2001) (stating that, "when Congress
revised § 330, it included a new subsection expressly providing for payment to attorneys for
Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 debtors in certain circumstances, but not those of Chapter 7
debtors.").
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1202 (2002); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (2002).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2002); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2002).
57. "The trustee may avoid a sale ... and may recover any costs, attorneys' fees .... 11
U.S.C. § 363(n) (2002).
58. "[T]he court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable
attorney's fee for, the proceeding .... 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2002).
59. "(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed .... including (4) reasonable com-
pensation for professional services rendered by an attorney .... " 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (2002).
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ter 7 or Chapter 1160 against a qualified debtor and the petition is
subsequently dismissed by means other than on consent of all peti-
tioners and the debtor, the debtor may be entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee from the petitioners.61 Finally, whenever a person will-
fully violates an automatic stay provision, an injured individual shall
be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the violator.62 Thus,
these situations make it clear that Congress wants attorneys to be
compensated for their services. However, Congress has been unclear
as to why it no longer allows for a debtor's attorney to be compen-
sated from the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case
where a trustee has been appointed.
The history of fees for a debtor's attorney has been interesting.
While the Act was in enforcement, a debtor's attorney was entitled to
fees, but the court had great discretion in determining what was rea-
sonable. With the enactment of the Code, Congress has created
guidelines for the courts to follow when construing the definition of
reasonableness. With the 1994 amendments, it is unclear as to
whether a debtor's attorney is entitled to compensation from the
bankruptcy estate in cases where a trustee has been appointed in
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. This problem has troubled the courts for the
last nine years, including the Fourth Circuit in Equipment Services.
B. Court of Appeals Cases That Have Construed § 330 (a)
After the 1994 Amendments
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Equipment Services, five
other circuit courts had confronted the language of § 330(a). Three of
the circuits concluded that a debtor's attorney should be allowed to
receive reasonable compensation. Two of the circuits ruled, as did the
Fourth Circuit in Equipment Services, that a debtor's attorney should
not be compensated.
1. In re Ames Department Stores, Inc.63
The first court to confront the irregular language of § 330(a) after
the 1994 amendments was the Second Circuit. It disagreed with the
60. There cannot be an involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 12 or 13.
61. "If the court dismisses a petition under this section (involuntary bankruptcy) ... the court
may grant judgment-(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for-(B) a reasonable
attorney's fee." 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1)(B) (2002).
62. "An individual injured by an willful violation of a stay ... shall recover actual damages
including costs and attorneys' fees .... 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2002).
63. In re Ames Dep't. Stores, 76 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir. 1996).
2003]
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court in Equipment Services and felt that Congress mistakenly omitted
the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney."
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom ("Skadden") represented
Ames Department Stores, its affiliates, and subsidiaries ("Ames") in a
reorganization under Chapter 11. During the Chapter 11 proceeding,
a dispute arose over terms of a contract, and thus, Skadden's fees to-
taled $35,000. A trustee was never appointed.
The bankruptcy court held that Skadden was not entitled to its at-
torneys' fees64 and the district court affirmed. 65 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the omission of the phrase "or to
the debtor's attorney" was "inadvertent. ' 66 Since a trustee was never
appointed, the real issue in this case was whether Skadden was charg-
ing excessive fees. The court held that the firm was not. The court
went beyond the facts of its case and asserted, in dictum and relying
on Collier,67 that § 330(a) allows for compensation of a debtor's attor-
ney.68 The court remanded ordering the bankruptcy court to redeter-
mine attorney fees based on whether counsel's services are reasonably
likely to benefit the debtor's estate, not whether counsel is able to
show an actual benefit to the estate.
2. Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc v. Family Snacks, Inc.69
The next court to analyze the amended version of § 330(a) was the
Fifth Circuit. This court's outcome and reasoning is shared with the
court in Equipment Services in holding that the court is bound to fol-
low the language of the statute.
Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc. ("Pro-Snax") was forced into a Chapter
7 bankruptcy that was later converted to a Chapter 11, and then re-
converted to a Chapter 7. The law firm of Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P.
("Andrews") represented Pro-Snax in its bankruptcy proceedings.
The bankruptcy court concluded that Andrews could be awarded
compensation from the bankruptcy estate under § 330 for the work it
did as the corporation's attorney after the appointment of the Chapter
64. In re Ames Dep't. Stores, No. 93 Civ. 2192 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1995).
65. 1995 WL 338253 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated by 76 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996). The court denied
fees not due to the language of § 330(a) but because Skadden had requested excessive fees.
66. Ames Dep't. Stores, 76 F.3d at 71.
67. See infra Part IV.B.2.
68. "Where the benefits of services to the estate are the same, it makes no sense to treat
performances of such benefits by debtors' attorneys differently than performances by other re-
tained professionals." Ames Dep't Stores, 76 F.3d at 71.
69. In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
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11 trustee. 70 The court felt that although § 330 did not explicitly
award fees to the debtor's attorney, the language of the statute was
vague and did not preclude an award in favor of Andrews. However,
the court felt that by relying on language in § 330(a)(4)(A), 71 An-
drews was entitled to most of the fees and expenses that it asked for.72
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court concluding that An-
drews was not entitled to fees after the Chapter 11 trustee was ap-
pointed.73 The district court also remanded the case in order for it to
recalculate the amount of fees that Andrews should receive under the
American Rule.74
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.75
Andrews made two arguments. First, it argued that when looking at
the congressional intent of the 1994 Amendment to § 330(a), Con-
gress did not intend to deny the debtors' attorneys their fees. The
court examined the statute and concluded that it was unclear at this
juncture what Congress intended.76
Andrews' second argument was that public policy suggests a broad
reading of § 330(a) to encourage attorneys to represent debtors. The
court did not examine this issue because it concluded that it is bound
by its canons of construction and simply cannot alter the meaning of a
statute.77 However, the court did not necessarily feel that this result
was the one intended when Congress amended § 330.78
70. In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 204 B.R. 492, 495-97 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996), vacated by 212
B.R. 834 (N.D. Tex. 1997) affd, 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
71. "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for - (i)
unnecessary duplication of services; or (ii) services that were not-(I) reasonably likely to bene-
fit the debtor's estate; or (II) necessary to the administration of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(4)(A) (2002).
72. Andrews asked for $44,638 in fees and $10,725.37 in expenses and the court reduced those
numbers to $30,000 for fees and $7500 for expenses.
73. Family Snacks, Inc. v. Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 834, 838 (N.D. Tex. 1997), affd,
157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that, "[t]his court disagrees with the analysis of the bank-
ruptcy court. Its award is contrary to the plain language of § 330(a) in its current version and
must find support, if at all in the concept that Congress did not mean what it said in the 1994
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code or, alternatively, that the bankruptcy court has inherent
authority to make exceptions to the American Rule. Neither of these positions is persuasive.").
74. The American Rule is that each party generally bears its own litigation expenses unless a
statute authorizes the fees to be shifted.
75. Pro-Snax Distribs., 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
76. Id. at 423.
77. "[W]e must commence our analysis by examining the plain language of the relevant stat-
ute .... and here our reading of § 330(a) begins and ends our inquiry." Id. at 425.
78. "We decide the issue before us bound by our conventions of statutory construction, even
though common sense might lead the lay observer to conclude that a different result is perhaps
more appropriate. The law and the rules to which we adhere in order to interpret it, does not
always conform to the dictates of common sense." Id. at 423.
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3. In re Century Cleaning Services, Inc.79
The next court to confront the problem of interpreting the language
of § 330(a) was the Ninth Circuit. This court disagreed with Equip-
ment Services and held that an attorney can be compensated from the
bankruptcy estate for services rendered after the appointment of a
trustee. The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed this conclusion.80
Century Cleaning Services ("Century") obtained the law firm of
Garvey, Schubert & Barer ("Garvey") to represent it in its Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding. Century's petition was later converted to a
Chapter 7. Garvey then applied for fees totaling $12,770.87 for ser-
vices that it performed after the petition was changed to a Chapter 7. 81
The bankruptcy court held that the language of § 330(a) did not au-
thorize payment to Garvey.82 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
affirmed. 83
The court of appeals reversed after conducting an extensive review
of the language and legislative history of § 330.84 The court found that
the statute was ambiguous because the conjunction "or" was not in-
serted before "professional person" in § 330(a). 85 Since the court
found the statute ambiguous, it took an extensive look at the legisla-
tive history of § 330.86 The court determined that there was no intent
by Congress to change the substantive meaning of the statute.
The court found three reasons why the omission of the phrase, "or
to the debtor's attorney" was inadvertent. First, there is an absence of
any effort to have the questioned sentence parallel with the sentence
that includes the word "attorney" in the next sentence of § 330. Sec-
79. In re Century Cleaning Servs., 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. In re Smith, 305 F. 3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]his panel, of course, may not
overrule a prior panel of this court, and if we could, Smith offers no persuasive reason why we
should.").
81. See Century Cleaning Servs., 195 F.3d at 1055. Garvey filed petition papers, prepared
schedules, amended reports, a statement of affair, a Rule 2015 request, communicated with cred-
itors and participated in 2004 examinations.
82. In re Century Cleaning Servs., 202 B.R. 149 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996), aff d 215 B.R. 18
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), vacated by 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
83. Century Cleaning Servs., v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning Servs.,
Inc.), 215 B.R. 18 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), vacated by 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). The court
simply looked at the language of § 330(a) and felt that it did not allow for the payment of fees to
a debtor's attorney once a trustee has been appointed. However, the court allowed Garvey to
receive most of its fees under state lien law because of the lien that Garvey held.
84. Century Cleaning Servs., 157 F.3d at 1057.
85. "A careful examination of § 330(a)(1) reveals an unavoidable and substantial ambiguity
.... .Id. The court felt that since phrase "trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney"
from § 330(a)(2) does not correspond to the language in § 330(a)(1), which includes only "trus-
tee, examiner, professional person."
86. See id. at 1058-60.
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ond, the disputed sentence omits the conjunction, "or" which would
make the sentence grammatically correct. Third, the court said that if
Congress deliberately intended to amend § 330, there would have
been some sign in the legislative history of § 330, and this court found
none.
Judge Thomas wrote an often-cited and convincing dissent. 87 He
felt that the statute was not ambiguous and should therefore "end the
discussion."' 8 He also noted that the majority placed too much em-
phasis on the omission of the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney"
when it is equally as likely that the inadvertent error was the omission
of the word "or."'89
4. In re American Steel Product, Inc.90
The fourth circuit attempt to resolve the problem of § 330(a) was
the Eleventh Circuit. This court agreed with Equipment Services by
adopting the plain meaning of § 330(a).
American Steel Product, Inc. ("American") was involuntarily
placed into Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court converted it
to a Chapter 11 proceeding; subsequently it was converted back to a
Chapter 7. Inglesby, Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C., ("In-
glesby") a law firm, was appointed as counsel for American. When
the bankruptcy proceedings concluded, Inglesby asked for court ap-
proval of its attorney's fees in the total amount of $30,141.87. Part of
this amount, $19,600.00, had already been paid as a retainer prior to
the filing of the initial petition.
The bankruptcy court looked at the plain language of § 330 and de-
cided that Inglesby was not entitled to the $10,541.87, which was still
owed for work done after the filing because a trustee was automati-
cally appointed when American's creditors in Chapter 7 involuntarily
filed the petition.91 The district court affirmed. 92
The court of appeals upheld the district court decision.93 The court
examined the statute and determined that it was not ambiguous; thus,
the court felt it must follow the plain meaning of the statute. The
court disregarded the legislative history and grammatical evaluation
of § 330 because it felt that "our cannons of construction do not re-
87. See id. at 1061-65.
88. Id. at 1062.
89. Century Cleaning Servs., Inc. 157 F.3d at 1063.
90. In re American Steel Prod., 197 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
91. Moore v. Emery (In re American Steel Prod.), 203 B.R. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), affd
197 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
92. American Steel Prod., 197 F.3d at 1355.
93. Id. at 1356.
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quire nay, do not permit-us to consider these exogenous sources when
the statute is clear textually on its face." 94
5. In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc.95
The final circuit court to analyze § 330(a), before the Fourth Circuit
in Equipment Services, was the Third Circuit. This court sided with
the Second and Ninth Circuits and felt that after the appointment of a
trustee a debtor's attorney is entitled to his or her fees from the bank-
ruptcy estate.
The Lipari family owned two businesses, Top Grade Sausage, Inc.
("Top Grade") and Florist Distributors, Inc. ("Florist"). Top Grade
and Florist were forced to file separate voluntary Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petitions. The bankruptcy court combined the cases, and a
trustee was appointed shortly after the filing.
As efforts to form a reorganization plan under Chapter 11 for Top
Grade and Florist failed, it was forced to convert into a Chapter 7
liquidation bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court did not allow the attor-
ney to receive compensation for services rendered after the debtors'
petitions were converted to Chapter 7 because it found the attorney's
services were solely for the benefit of the debtor and not for the bank-
ruptcy estate.96 It did not touch on the language of § 330(a).
The attorney appealed to the district court, which raised for the first
time the issue of whether a bankruptcy court may award fees to the
debtor's attorney under § 330(a) from the bankruptcy estate. 97 The
district court held that the omission of "debtor's attorney" was inad-
vertent and the attorney could still recover.
The court of appeals held that a Chapter 7 debtor's attorneys could
receive compensation because the language of § 330(a) is ambigu-
ous.98 The court analyzed the language of the statute and felt the
omission of the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney" and the lack of
the conjunction "or," "render the section grammatically unsound." 99
After finding the statute ambiguous, the court then found that the leg-
islative history of the statute does not manifest an intent of Congress
to change the long-standing practice of compensating debtor's attor-
neys from the bankruptcy estate.' 00
94. Id.
95. In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123 (3rd Cir. 2000).
96. In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., (Ch. 11) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 8, 1996).
97. Hellring Linderman Goldstein & Siegal, LLP v. Suplee (In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc.),
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16529 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 1999).
98. Top Grade Sausage, 227 F.3d at 127.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 130.
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Therefore, including the decision from Equipment Services, the cir-
cuit courts have split three to three. It is interesting at this point to
note that in the circuits where the court of appeals has not decided the
issue, the federal courts are split nine to eight. Nine have held that
the statute must be given its plain meaning;10 1 eight have found § 330
to be ambiguous. 10 2
III. SUBJECT OPINION: IN RE EQUIPMENT SERVICES, INC.1 0 3
This note will now analyze the Fourth Circuit's decision in Equip-
ment Services. It is the sixth case in the line of circuit court cases that
have examined the language of § 330(a). The Fourth Circuit sided
with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the court is bound
to follow the plain meaning of a statute. Thus, creating the current
three to three split among the circuits that have attempted to solve the
discrepancy of the language of § 330(a).
Equipment Services, Inc. ("Equipment") filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition on December 24, 1998 and was represented by John M.
Lamie ("Lamie"). Equipment paid Lamie a $6,000 retainer of which
$1,000 was used to pay the fees and costs of filing the Chapter 11
petition. Lamie then deposited the remaining $5,000 in his client es-
crow account. Prior to the conversion of the Chapter 11 petition to
Chapter 7, Lamie earned $1,325 in fees and $3.85 in costs.
On March 17, 1999, on a motion by the United States Trustee,
Equipment's Chapter 11 petition was converted to a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding during which Lamie earned another $1,000. On June 5, 2000,
Lamie filed an application with the bankruptcy court, seeking ap-
proval of attorney's fees for $2,325 and the $3.85 in costs. The United
States Trustee objected to the $1,000 earned during the Chapter 7 pro-
101. See In re Ramey, 266 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2001); Schroeder v. Rouse (In re
Redding), 242 B.R. 468 (Bankr.W.D. Mo. 1999); In re Thomas, 195 B.R. 18 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1996); In re Friedland, 182 B.R. 576 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995); In re Kinnemore, 181 B.R. 520
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1995); In re Skinner, 240 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1999); In re Johnson, 234
B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1999); In re Keller Fin. Servs. of Fla., Inc., 243 B.R. 806 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1999); In re Fassinger, 191 B.R. 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
102. See United States Trustee v. Eggleston Works Loudspeaker Co. (In re Eggleston Works
Loudspeaker Co.), 253 B.R. 519 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Hodes, 235 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D.Kan. 1999)
withdrawn, 1999 WL 236183; In re Bottone, 226 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.Mass. 1998); In re Miller,
211 B.R. 399 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997); Melp, Ltd. v. Melp, Ltd. (In re Melp, Ltd.), 179 B.R. 636
(E.D. Mo. 1995); Taylor v. Peyton (In re Taylor), 250 B.R. 869 (E.D. Va. 2000); In re Brierwood
Manor, Inc., 239 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999); In re Stroudsburg Dyeing & Finishing Co., 209
B.R. 648 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997).
103. In re Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1480 (2003).
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ceeding because § 330(a) "makes no provision for counsel of the
debtor to be compensated by the estate."'1 04
The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee holding that § 330(a)
does not authorize a debtor's attorney to be paid funds from the bank-
ruptcy estate for services rendered after the case is converted to a
Chapter 7 proceeding. 10 5 First, the court said that such a "ruling is
based on the most logical and apparent interpretation of the effect of
the 1994 amendment of § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code."'10 6 Second,
the court thought that this was the best alternative that it could use to
achieve consistency throughout its district.10 7 However, the bank-
ruptcy court held that Lamie was entitled to his fees because the re-
tainer was not part of the bankruptcy estate. 10 8
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court on both grounds. 10 9
The court examined the legislative history of § 330, but it determined
that it must follow the plain meaning of the statute.110 The court also
agreed with the bankruptcy court that Lamie was still entitled to his
fees from the retainer because it was not property of the estate.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the first ground and reversed on the
second ground.' It began by noting that the previous circuits that
decided this issue have split three to two. Lamie argued that the omis-
sion of the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney" from the 1986 version
of § 330(a) of the Code was inadvertent and the result of a scrivener's
error and thus, renders the statute ambiguous, permitting courts to
look at the legislative history when interpreting the statute.
Meanwhile, the trustee argued that one has to read § 330(a) as it is
written and give the statute its plain meaning. The trustee also argued
that policy reasons support this conclusion. First, he noted that in a
Chapter 7 proceeding, the debtors and the creditors do not work as a
team. Second, in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee is authorized to
hire attorneys at the estate's expense as needed to help liquidate the
estate, negating the need for the assistance of the debtor's attorney.
Finally, he pointed out that in a Chapter 7 proceeding, a debtor's at-
104. Id. at 743.
105. In re Equip. Servs., Inc., 253 B.R. 724 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000), affd, 260 B.R. 273 (W.D.
Va. 2001), affd in part and rev'd in part In re Equip. Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. granted, 2003 WL 891324.
106. Id. at 728.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 729-733.
109. Equip. Servs., Inc. v. Equip. Servs., Inc. (In re Equip. Servs., Inc.), 260 B.R. 273 (W.D.Va.
2001), affd in part and rev'd in part, In re Equip. Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S.Ct 1480 (2003).
110. See id.
111. Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d at 743.
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torney cannot do the type of good work that could enlarge the estate
like in a Chapter 11 proceeding because a Chapter 7 proceeding is a
zero-sum game. 112
The court recognized both sides of the argument but decided to rule
for the trustee. It felt that the statute must be given its plain meaning.
The court also noted that when § 330(a) was revised, the courts must
presume that Congress intended to make the change that it did; other-
wise, Congress would have changed it by now. It has had eight years
to make such a change and nothing has come of it. The court noted
that if Congress did indeed make the change in error, it should correct
it and not this court. 113 As to the second issue in the case, the court
reversed the district court holding that the leftover portion of the re-
tainer became part of the bankruptcy estate when the Chapter 11 peti-
tion was filed.
Justice Michael filed a short, dissenting opinion expressing that he
agreed with the other circuits that felt the omission was an error.114
He cited and agreed with the reasoning used in Pro-Snax and Ameri-
can Steel.
IV. ANALYSIS
The court in Equipment Services made the correct decision although
it was not the one that Congress intended. The meaning of § 330(a) is
not ambiguous in that it does not include the debtor's personal attor-
ney in the list of those eligible for compensation from the bankruptcy
estate in a Chapter 7 or 11 proceeding where a trustee has been ap-
pointed. However, there is strong evidence that Congress did not in-
tend to make a substantive change to § 330. Congress simply made a
huge error and should be responsible in resolving its own mistake.
However, since Congress has been slow in doing so, it is necessary for
the Supreme Court to step in and resolve this problem.
As a result of the omission of the phrase "or to the debtor's attor-
ney," § 330(a) has been read by three circuits as providing that a
debtor's attorney in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding
is not entitled to any compensation from the bankruptcy estate.1 15
Thus, these circuits have interpreted § 330(a) to mean that a debtor's
112. See id. at 728.
113. "Because the plain language of § 330(a) as it is now written is unambiguous and is rea-
sonable in application, we are constrained to enforce the language as written." Id. at 745.
114. "This drafting error should not prevent a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney from being paid
with funds from the estate, just as he could be before the error occurred." Id. at 748.
115. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text; notes 90-94 and accompanying text; and
notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
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attorney is not entitled to any fees earned after the filing of the peti-
tion and appointment of a trustee because then the attorney would be
requesting fees from the bankruptcy estate. They find that § 330(a) is
not ambiguous; thus, they are confined to follow the plain meaning of
the language of the statute.
Alternatively, three circuits have held that a debtor's attorney after
the appointment of a trustee is entitled to reasonable compensation
from the bankruptcy estate. 116 These circuits hold that the statute is
ambiguous, and since it is, the court could solve the ambiguity by
looking to the legislative history of the statute to determine the intent
of Congress; these courts have found that Congress never intended
the change.
At this juncture, it is important to understand the different roles of
the trustee in Chapter 7 and 11 bankruptcies. In a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, a trustee is automatically appointed at the filing of the peti-
tion. In many instances, a debtor can benefit by having an attorney
present at the § 341 meeting.117 Also, if a creditor challenges whether
certain property was properly exempted, the debtor may want an at-
torney to represent the debtor's interests. However, the present lan-
guage of the statute has been held by some courts to not allow for the
attorney to be compensated.
Alternatively, the debtor would have to rely on the trustee to de-
fend him, her or it, but the trustee and debtor have different goals.
The trustee's goal is to maximize the bankruptcy estate, while the
debtor's goal is to maintain as much of the property as possible. This
inherent tension suggests that Congress would never intend for a
debtor's attorney not to be compensated and to have the debtor's per-
sonal interests to only be represented by the trustee.
In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a trustee is not automatically ap-
pointed. In a majority of these cases the debtor plays the roll of trus-
tee and is called a debtor-in-possession. 1 8 The debtor-in-possession
has the same functions that a trustee would have. A debtor would
want to remain in possession because he, she or the organization pre-
sumably knows how to effectively run the business, or at least better
than the trustee would. In situations where a debtor remains in pos-
116. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text; notes 79-88 and accompanying text; and
notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2002). This is referred to as the meeting of creditors and equity
security holders. In a Chapter 7 case, the trustee has the duty to make sure that the debtor is
aware of his, her or its rights. In most cases, an attorney is beneficial to the debtor in this
situation.
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2002). This section gives the debtor the first right to propose a
reorganization plan. An attorney is usually beneficial to the debtor in this situation.
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session of the business, an attorney for the debtor would definitely be
entitled to fees that may accrue after the filing because there is no
bankruptcy estate, and the debtor acting as trustee has many duties to
perform.
However, sometimes a trustee is appointed at the filing of a Chap-
ter 11 petition. In these cases there is no debtor-in-possession because
the trustee is in possession of the business. He or she essentially runs
the business in place of the debtor. In these situations, the plain lan-
guage of § 330(a) has been interpreted by many courts to not allow
the debtor's attorney to receive compensation. The trustee would
handle any problems that arise with the bankruptcy because he or she
is now in possession. If the trustee requires the services of an attorney,
that attorney would be compensated because that person is represent-
ing the trustee and is performing beneficial services for the estate.
Also, many times a debtor will remain in possession of the business
at the beginning of a Chapter 11 filing, but the business will not be
able to make its required payments under the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion plan and will be forced to transfer to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Of
course, when the petition is transferred, a trustee is automatically ap-
pointed. Thus, the debtor's attorney would no longer be entitled to
compensation because the case would now be in a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing, and the trustee would manage the estate. Also, note that if the
trustee requires an attorney in a Chapter 7 or 11 proceeding, that at-
torney is entitled to reasonable compensation under the Code.
A. Arguments Why the Fourth Circuit's Decision in
Equipment Services Was Correct
There are four common arguments why the court in Equipment Ser-
vices correctly decided that the debtor's attorney, John Lamie, was not
entitled to compensation from the bankruptcy estate after the ap-
pointment of a trustee. First, and most importantly, § 330(a) has a
clear and plain meaning. Second, it is not clear that the phrase, "or to
the debtor's attorney," was mistakenly omitted. Third, many believed
that bankruptcy attorneys were charging far too high fees prior to the
1994 amendments. Fourth, the fact that § 330(a)(4)(B) was included
in the 1994 amendments.
1. Courts Must Follow the Plain Meaning
First of all, when a statute is not ambiguous, the court is required to
follow the plain meaning of the statute.' 19 Therefore, it is unnecessary
119. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
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to look to the legislative history because the case law does not support
that response. 120 Several courts have followed this approach. 121 If
courts begin ignoring the plain meaning of a statute, then the purpose
of a legislature is no longer being met. When the founding fathers met
in Philadelphia in 1789, they envisioned a system of checks and bal-
ances between the legislature, executive, and judicial branches of the
government. They created mechanisms within the constitution to en-
sure this system. After all, the legislature is elected by the people to
create the laws for its society.
It is well settled that courts are required to apply the plain-meaning
canon of statutory construction in interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code.122 The Supreme Court has stated that when interpreting the
Code, "as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,
there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain lan-
guage of the statute."' 23 Although the legislative history and a brief
syntactical evaluation of the clause at issue suggest that Congress may
have inadvertently neglected to include a debtor's attorney as one of
the individuals entitled to compensation, "our cannons of construction
do not require nay, do not permit us to consider these exogenous
sources when the statute is clear textually on its face."'1 24
Authority also exists that when a bill has been reintroduced, any
deletion from the prior version of the bill should be seen as a clear
intention by Congress that it does not want that language in the stat-
ute. Since the deletion of the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney"
occurred after it was originally introduced to the Senate, 125 courts
should infer as a matter of statutory construction that Congress inten-
tionally rejected the earlier version of the Senate bill.' 26
The main issue in deciding whether a debtor's attorney is entitled to
compensation is whether the current language of the statute is clear
on its face. One can be certain that the language is clear. Section
330(a)(1) lists the individuals who can receive compensation. A
debtor's attorney is not included on this list. It only allows compensa-
120. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993) (stating that "[r]ecourse to the legislative
history is unnecessary in light of the plain meaning this text.").
121. See supra note 101.
122. See In re American Steel Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
123. BFP v. Resolution Trust, 511 U.S. 531, 566 (1994) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-241 (1989)).
124. Pro-Snax Distribs. v. Family Snacks, 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
125. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
126. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (holding that when a legislature
reintroduces a bill and language is missing from the first time the bill was introduced, it may be
presumed that the deletion was intentional) (emphasis added).
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tion for the "trustee, an examiner, a professional person.' 27 Since
these three individuals are listed and a debtor's attorney is not, it is
unnecessary to look beyond the language of the statute.
2. No Clear Evidence Exists that the Omission was a Mistake
Second, it is not clear whether the omission of the phrase "or to the
debtor's attorney" was a mistake. It is equally possible that the scriv-
ener's error was not the omission of that phrase, but the omission of
the word "or" between "examiner" and "professional person," which
is less substantive than the clause, "to the debtor's attorney. '128 It is
also important to note the Supreme Court's holding that courts should
disregard punctuation to determine the meaning of a statute.1 29 Thus,
if courts disregard the punctuation of § 330, then the statute is not
ambiguous.
When the grammatical words of a statute seem awkward, the duty
of the court construing the statute is to "presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.' 130
Whether Congress intended debtor's attorneys to be compensated af-
ter the 1994 amendments is not what courts should look at. It is un-
necessary for courts to look any further than the language of § 330.
3. Many felt attorneys were already receiving too
much compensation
Third, prior to the passage of the 1994 Amendments, courts had
unilaterally imposed significant fee restrictions on attorneys for Chap-
ter 7 debtors. 131 Thus, it was not a universal holding that attorneys
should be compensated for fees from the bankruptcy estate after the
127. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2002).
128. See In re Century Cleaning Servs., 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993).
130. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
131. See In re Kahler, 84 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Col. 1988). This case involved two attorneys
who were seeking pre-petition fees from the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 proceeding, and
also, one of them was seeking post-petition fees for services. The court denied both attorneys
their pre and post-petition fees from the estate because among other reasons, the fees were not
reasonable. See also In re NRG Res., Inc., 64 B.R. 643 (W.D. La. 1986). This court took a strong
position in that once a trustee is appointed, no debtor's attorney should be awarded fees because
he can perform no beneficial purpose unless he received prior court approval. See also In re
Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 1995 WL 338253 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated by 76 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir.
1996) (stating that, "[t]oo many members of the bankruptcy bar have grown accustomed to sub-
mitting 'billable hours' without regard to anything other than their own profit. It is for all of
them that I now take pen in hand."). See generally Professional Fees in Bankr.: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Adm. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992).
These hearings discussed how attorneys were receiving too much compensation, which is where
the new § 330 came from.
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appointment of a trustee. Also, many feel that once a trustee has
been appointed in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee can handle any
problems that arise.
This position is primarily asserted since the debtor no longer has
control of the property. The debtor's property is now property of the
estate. The trustee ensures that the creditors are getting paid appro-
priately. Essentially, the only situations where an attorney might be
needed is the § 341 meeting 32 or when a creditor makes a challenge
to the classification of a piece of the debtor's property. Even in this
latter situation though, the trustee is responsible for correctly classify-
ing the property.
However, an attorney for a Chapter 11 debtor has different respon-
sibilities and duties since in a majority of cases the debtor will remain
in possession. Thus, the debtor takes on the role of trustee, and as
described earlier, an attorney is necessary. A stronger argument is
that when there is a trustee in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor's
attorney should not receive compensation because the trustee resolves
any situations that arise during the bankruptcy, which basically leaves
the debtor with very little responsibilities.
4. Added Section to § 330 for Chapter 12 and 13 Attorneys
A key amendment to § 330 from the 1994 amendments was that it
added an extra section that refers only to attorneys in Chapter 12. or
13 proceedings. 133 This section allows for compensation for debtors'
attorneys in these types of bankruptcies even after the appointment of
a trustee. Some courts have relied on this section as a specific and
clear intention by Congress not to include compensation for debtors'
attorneys in Chapter 7 or 11 proceedings. 134
If Congress intended for all debtors' attorneys to be compensated
under § 330(a)(1), it would have been redundant to add this section
because it ensures that Chapter 12 or 13 debtors are compensated.
However, it is important to note again that the trustee's role in a
Chapter 12 or 13 case is much less significant than that of a trustee in
Chapter 7 or 11.135 Thus, the debtor's attorney has a much greater
role and would be more justified in receiving compensation. This sec-
tion could have been added to ensure that attorneys for Chapter 12
132. See supra note 116.
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (2002).
134. See In re Ramey, 266 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2001); see also In re Friedland, 182
B.R. 576 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995).
135. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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and 13 debtors were compensated because of the extra work they per-
form as compared to Chapter 7 or 11 debtors' attorneys.
B. Arguments Why the Fourth Circuit's Decision in
Equipment Services was Incorrect
Four arguments are commonly made as to why the Fourth Circuit in
Equipment Services should have ruled in favor of Lamie. First, the
statute is ambiguous. Second, the statute lacks Congressional intent.
Third, § 330 does not correlate with other compensation provisions of
the Code. Fourth, public policy is in Lamie's favor.
1. Ambiguity in § 330
Again, the key issue in the analysis is whether the language of the
§ 330(a) is ambiguous. Several courts have held that § 330 is ambigu-
ous for two reasons. 136 First, consider the individuals listed in back-to-
back sections of §330. Section 330(a)(1) contains the phrase "a trus-
tee, an examiner, a professional person employed under Section 327
or 1103."137 Meanwhile, § 330(a)(1)(A), which is immediately follow-
ing, contains the same three persons - trustee, examiner, professional
person, but then adds "or attorney."'138 Nothing appears in the statute
or in the legislative history that can logically explain why these two
sections that immediately follow each other do not correlate. Section
330(a)(1) cannot be read on its own. It has to be read in conjunction
with § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B), and the only purpose that seems to exist
for listing the four individuals in § 330(a)(1)(A) is to reiterate those
listed in § 330(a)(1). This provides strong evidence that the omission
was a mistake.
Second, some courts feel that the lack of the conjunction, 'or,' after
'examiner' in § 330(a)(1) renders the statute ambiguous because the
statute is then grammatically unsound.139 They feel that this is further
proof that Congress made a mistake and accidentally left out "or to
the debtor's attorney." It is safe to say that if an 'or' had been placed
in the current version of § 330 after 'examiner,' then the statute would
not be ambiguous, which would have been a clear intention by Con-
gress to not include a debtor's attorney among those who should re-
ceive compensation.
However, simply because two sections of a statute that are next to
each other do not correlate and that a conjunction is missing is not
136. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2002).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2002).
139. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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enough to render a statute ambiguous. Courts holding in this manner
must have had an eye on the legislative history of the statute and were
looking backwards to find an ambiguity. This is an incorrect approach
because courts must first look to the language of the statute.
2. Lack of Congressional Intent
If a court determines that a statute is ambiguous, only then can it
look to the legislative history to determine the intent of Congress. A
strong argument can be made that congressional intent to change the
substantive meaning of § 330 is lacking.
Collier on Bankruptcy ("Collier") agrees with this position giving it
extra weight. A citation to Collier carries far more weight in bank-
ruptcy litigation than a citation to a secondary authority in other liti-
gation.' 40 Collier argues that to construe the change in language of
§ 330(a) as not allowing a debtor's attorney to be compensated would
represent a fundamental change in the law.141 It suggests that since
the change is inconsistent with current case law and that the legislative
history of § 330 does not support such a drastic change, courts should
construe the deletion as unintended. 142 Collier is not the only author-
ity in bankruptcy to take this position. Norton, although lacking the
same amount of authoritative weight as Collier, also agrees with this
position. 43
Collier also states that since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
covers a wide range of bankruptcy provisions and amendments,' tech-
nical errors are to be expected. 44 Although this may all be true, one
cannot simply ignore the language of the statute and decide not to
follow it. Ignoring the language would defy the reasoning behind hav-
ing a legislature create laws to only have the courts construe their own
meaning. If the change was simply the result of a scrivener's error,
then Congress should correct the problem. It could be that Congress
does not want to own up to its mistake considering all of the litigation
that already has taken place over this issue. Collier even goes on to
say that in most instances, the amendments are well drafted, and the
defects noted should not detract from the overall usefulness of the
140. JOHN SILAS HOPKINS, THE BANKRUPTCY LITIOATOR'S HANDBOOK 33, A.L.I. 1993.
141. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 91 330.06 (15th ed. 1995).
142. Id.
143. See WILLIAM L. NORTON., JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 26:5 (2d
ed. 2002) (stating that "it seems that at the very least ambiguity exists, and in view of the lack of
legislative history evidencing an intent by Congress to revise the treatment of attorney compen-
sation under § 330(a)(1), the courts should interpret the statute in the same manner that existed
prior to the 1994 Amendments.").
144. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $1 330.06 (15th ed. 1995).
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Code.145 This argument by Collier seems to say that one should follow
most of the Code but not necessarily all of it, which is not an appropri-
ate approach.
3. Section 330 as Compared to § 329 and § 331
Section 329 directly precedes § 330 in the Code. It "permits the
debtor's attorney to receive a reasonable retainer for services ren-
dered in contemplation of, or to be rendered in connection, a case
under the bankruptcy code."'1 46 Section 329 requires that the attorney
submit to the bankruptcy court a detailed description of the retainer
which the court "may cancel any such agreement, or order the return
of such payment, to the extent excessive.1 47 Thus, according to Col-
lier, "Section 329 ... would be superfluous if the deletion in section
330(a) is construed as exempting debtors' counsel from compensation
under 330."148 This is even more evidence that the omission of "or to
the debtor's attorney" was a mistake.
If one takes a look at § 331, one would notice that it starts off by
saying, "A trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any profes-
sional person. ... ",149 Note that these are the exact same four persons
included in § 330(a) before the 1994 amendments. As mentioned ear-
lier,150 in § 330(a)(1)(A) it includes these same four persons as well. 15'
Mentioning almost the exact same four people suggests that they cor-
respond to one another throughout these sections, which means that
the .omission of the phrase "or the debtor's attorney" after the 1994
amendments was simply a scrivener's error.
4. Public Policy
Public policy supports allowing a debtor's attorney to receive com-
pensation from the bankruptcy estate after the appointment of a trus-
tee. An attorney would be extremely reluctant to represent a debtor
in this situation because he or she knows that it would be difficult to
receive compensation. A debtor, just as anyone else, has the right to
have an attorney represent his or her personal interests.
Also, special policy problems exist when looking only at a Chapter 7
bankruptcy. A debtor's attorney in a Chapter 7 cannot do the same
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (2002).
148. COLLIER, supra note 144, 330.05.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (2002) (emphasis added).
150. See supra Part IV.B.1.
151. "[T]rustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional per-
son employed by any such person." 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2002).
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good work that a Chapter 11 attorney could do to enlarge the estate.
The trustee and the debtor are working against each other in a Chap-
ter 7 case because each has different goals and objectives. The trustee
wants as much of the debtor's property to be part of the estate as
possible. Meanwhile, the debtor wants to keep as much of his or her
property out of the estate as possible allowing him or her to keep
more of the property. Because of these different objectives, it makes
sense that a debtor's attorney should be compensated.
V. IMPACT
The biggest impact that the decision by the court in Equipment Ser-
vices will serve is to create an even three to three split between the
circuit courts that have ruled on this issue. This creates a greater ur-
gency for either the Supreme Court or Congress to act and to resolve
this problem before other courts needlessly waste more time deter-
mining how to interpret § 330(a). Since Congress has done nothing
for over nine years, the Supreme Court has felt that it must step in and
provide clarity to the situation. 152
Throughout the history of bankruptcy law in the United States, at-
torneys have been compensated for their services even after a trustee
has been appointed. Denying such fees may result in attorneys refus-
ing to help clients once a trustee has been appointed in their case.
This would result in more pro se proceedings which would be unin-
tended by Congress because it harms debtors and makes it more diffi-
cult for their interests to be protected.
A. The Supreme Court Should Not Have Granted Certiorari
First of all, this is not an issue for the Supreme Court to decide. 153
Although an obvious circuit split exists, it involves the reading of a
statute that is mistakenly written. However, because of the recent
failure of Congress to reform the Code yet again, the Supreme Court
must have felt that it was left with no choice but to step in and resolve
this problem.
The Supreme Court has two options. First, it can adopt the plain
meaning of the statute and hold that a debtor's attorney is not entitled
to attorney's fees. When a statute is clear on its face, it is not the place
of a court to interpret it any other way. By reaching this result, the
Court may force Congress to act and fix this problem.
152. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 123 S.Ct 1480 (2003).
153. See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 54 OKLA. L. REv., 727 (2001) (discussing how the Court decides which cases to hear).
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Second, it can accept the fact that Congress made an error and in-
terpret the statute as if the phrase, "or to the debtor's attorney," still
existed in the statute. This would be the appropriate result because
the evidence favors the position that Congress never intended to
make a substantive change to the law. However, in order to make this
determination, the Court has to conclude that the statute is ambigu-
ous, which it seemingly is not.154
B. Congress Should Address this Problem
Congress created this problem, so it is the appropriate vehicle to
resolve and fix its "little" mistake. Congress has two options. First, if
it decides that it did make a scrivener's error when it left out the
phrase "or the debtor's attorney," it could simply put the words back
into the statute, which is precisely what Congress should do. It would
give the statute the meaning it had prior to the 1994 amendments.
Second, if Congress intended for debtor's attorneys not to receive
compensation, then it needs to make the language of the statute clear.
Congress could simply place the conjunction "or," after "examiner"
into the current version of § 330(a)(1). 155 The legislative history does
not clearly reveal that Congress intended to change the substantive
meaning of § 330. It is odd and unusual that Congress would make
this type of change without providing any reasoning as to why it did
SO.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the omission of the phrase, or to the debtor's attorney, was an
accidental omission from § 330(a), then why hasn't Congress owned
up to and corrected its mistake? Six circuit courts' decisions have
struggled with this omission; three of them deciding that it was simply
a scrivener's error and three saying that Congress made the change
and the courts have no choice but to follow the plain meaning of the
statute. Courts are expounding unnecessary time and money deciding
this issue. Since Congress has not passed any bankruptcy reform
within the last nine years, the Supreme Court must have finally felt
that it should do something about it. It must decide whether § 330 is
ambiguous. If it is not, then the Court should follow the plain mean-
ing of the statute and hold that a debtor's attorney is not allowed com-
pensation. If the Court does decide that the statute is ambiguous,
then it would look at whether Congress intended the change. Once
154. See supra Part IV.B..
155. Id.
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the Court has looked at the legislative history of the statute, it would
assuredly hold that the intent to change the substantive nature of
§ 330 was lacking. Perhaps Congress will act before the Supreme
Court hears the case.
